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Legislation
A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Legislatures of several states have recently expressed an un-
precedented interest in the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution' by enacting statutes governing police and court pro-
cedures for search and seizure problems. New York, for example,
has adopted the much publicized "knock not"2 and "stop and
frisk ' 3 statutes. California, which has had more fourth amend-
ment litigation than any other state, has legislatively attempted to
expand the scope of statutorily authorized seizures. 4 Nebraska, fol-
lowing the lead of these states, has completely rewritten its search
and seizure statutes. Nearly all of the Nebraska statutes are adap-
tations of statutes which have originated in other states. The
fact that Nebraska, a state with few metropolitan areas and a re-
sulting low per capita crime rate, has enacted these statutes,
when the apparent need for them is slight, suggests that the mo-
tivation for their passage must have been something other than
need. That motivation was Mapp v. Ohio.5 Prior to Mapp there
was little fourth amendment legislative activity by the states.
6
Although Wolfe v. Colorado7 had applied the "core" of the fourth
amendment to the states, local law enforcement agencies were often
indifferent to the restrictions which the amendment theoretically
placed upon their activities since any evidence seized during an
unconstitutional search was still admissible in the state courts.,
Wolfe held the exclusionary rule to be inapplicable to the states,
1 The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
2 N.Y. CODE CRi. PROC. § 799.
3 N.Y. CODE CnMv. PROC. § 180(a).
4 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1524.
5 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
0 But see DEL. CODE AN. tit. 11, §§ 1902-03 (1953); R. I. GEN. LAws Aim.
§§ 12-7-1 to -2 (1956); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2, 594:3 (1960);
HAwAn REV. LAWS §§ 255-4, 5 (1955); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 41, §
98 (1961).
7 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8 Id. at 28.
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and the resulting practical effect on police procedure was negli-
gible. The fourth amendment was an empty promise.
In 1961, because some states had failed to voluntarily adopt
the exclusionary rule,9 in Mapp, the United States Supreme Court
gave teeth to the amendment and held the exclusionary rule ap-
plicable to the states.10 Justice Clark observed:
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the
right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state offi-
cers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit
that right to remain an enmpty promise."1
Mapp forced state compliance with the fourth amendment by ex-
cluding from a state criminal prosecution any evidence seized in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights.
But the imposition of the constitutional standards of search
and seizure upon the states has not been the only practical effect
of Mapp. It also imposed upon them the quagmire of confusion
which has surrounded the fourth amendment. For over seventy-
five years federal law enforcement officials have been plagued by
an amendment brimming with contradiction and confusion.'2 In
no other area of constitutional law has confusion been so pre-
dominant. Much of this confusion is no doubt attributable to the
slim margins upon which major decisions have been based.13 A
minor change in the composition of the court has often resulted in
the complete overruling of a prior decision.' 4 Confusion rather
than clarity has been the rule. Even the members of the Court
9 Nebraska was one of those states. "It is the doctrine of this state that
information pertinent to an issue is admissible in evidence notwith-
standing it was obtained in an irregular or illegal manner. The fact
that the constitutional guarantee concerning search and seizure has
been violated does not render the information received thereby inad-
missible. . ..." Haswell v. State, 167 Neb. 169, 171, 92 N.W.2d 161,
163 (1958).
10 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11 Id. at 660.
12 The first important case interpreting the fourth amendment and possi-
bly the origin of a portion of this confusion was Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
1s "Out of approximately 30 search and seizure cases decided by the
Court during the period, (1945-61) nearly two-thirds were determined
by 6-3 or 5-4 votes." Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court:
Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. Ray. 664, 666 n.15(1961).
14 For example, Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), was ex-
pressly overruled less than two years after it was decided by Rabi-
nowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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have recognized and often commented on this: "In no other
field has the law's uncertainty been more clearly manifested."'1
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures
has not-to put it mildly-run smooth."' 6
A major cause of this confusion has been the problem of inter-
preting an amendment, which is largely devoid of historical guide-
lines,'7 to meet the practical problems of crime prevention created
by a modern society. The existence of this confusion is most
unfortunate because day-to-day problems of law enforcement on
the local level require easily ascertainable standards of procedure
for policemen and courts that are not, at best, well versed in
subtle distinctions often made by the Supreme Court.
Congressional legislation could have eliminated much of this
confusion by providing guidelines for implementing the amend-
ment, as has been done in many other areas.' 8 Congress, however,
failed to do so, the result of which has been an aggravation of the
problem and a compounding of the confusion.
With an application of the fourth amendment to the states and
an awareness by them of the practical problems presented by the
application of the amendment to local problems, legislation by the
states is an excellent, if not ideal, solution to the establishment of
guidelines for the implementation of the amendment.19 This legis-
lation could serve the two-fold purpose of codifying standards of
search and seizure in areas where they have been established by
the Supreme Court, and, at the same time, provide workable
standards for police to follow where none have been expressed
15 Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56, 67 (1950) (Black, J. dis-
senting).
16 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring).
17 See Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A
Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259 (1950).
18 The only recent major federal legislation was the National Prohibition
Act which contained several explicit provisions for the seizure of illicit
liquor. 41 Stat. 305 (1919). See Appendix to Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582, 616, (1946) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) for a list of con-
gressional enactments relating to the fourth amendment.
19 Legislation on a local level, despite the lack of uniformity that would
be created, would undoubtedly be much more effective than federal
legislation, because local problems, which vary greatly between areas,
could be recognized. For example, problems of rural crime preven-
tion, as in Nebraska, certainly would not require legislation as re-
strictive of individual liberties as would be necessary in the large
metropolitan areas such as New York City.
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by the Court. With these goals in mind let us examine the recent
Nebraska legislation.
II. RECENT NEBRASKA LEGISLATION
Many of the recently adopted Nebraska statutes are adapta-
tions of Federal Rule 41.20 Several additions and modifications
have been made to the Federal Rules, however. In addition,
several statutes not originating in the Federal Rules have been
adopted by both the 1963 and 1965 sessions.
A. THE EViDENTLaY SEARCH
Neb. Rev. Stat. section 29-81321 provides that a warrant may be
issued to search for three distinct types of property: (1) property
stolen, embezzled, or obtained under false pretenses, (2) designed
or intended to be used for the commission of a crime, and (3) pos-
sessed, controlled, designed, or intended for use in violation of
the laws. This statute is a derivation of Federal Rule 41 and has
been adopted in several states.
A provision has been added to the statute, however, which is
not included in Rule 41. It provides that:
A warrant may be issued ... to search for and seize any property
which constitutes evidence that a criminal offense has been
committed or that a particular person has committed a criminal
offense.
22
This section appears to be a derivation of a similar California
statute which provides for the issuance of a warrant for "any
evidence which tends to show a felony has been committed."23
Serious constitutional questions are presented by this statute.
The federal standards24 of search and seizure prohibit the seizure
20 FED. R. Cami. P. 41.
21 NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-813 (Supp. 1963).
22 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-813 (Supp. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
23 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(4); See Manwaring, California and the Fourth
Amendment, 16 STAN'. L. REV. 318, 327-28 (1964). See also Wis. STAT.§ 963.02(10) (1958), which allows the seizure of any evidence of a
crime.
24 Although Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), had held the fourth
amendment applicable to the states the Court failed in Mapp to state
whether the standards of reasonableness applicable to the states under
the fourteenth amendment were identical to the fourth amendment
standards of reasonableness applicable to the federal courts. In Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), this question was answered when the
Court held that the fourth amendment, as applied through the four-
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of evidentiary material; seizures are limited to what has been
termed the "fruits" of crime. The federal prohibition against the
search for evidence is absolute, and any search for evidence is
per se unreasonable.25
The Supreme Court has generally distingushed between seiz-
able articles and evidence on the basis of the state's right to pos-
session of the article. Thus, there has developed around the pro-
hibition several classes of seizable articles. These include instru-
ments of a crime (the government having a right to seize the
article to suppress the nuisance it created) ,26 stolen property (the
true owner being entitled to possession),2T excisable or dutiable
goods (the government having a lien on the goods for unpaid
duties) ,28 and contraband (possession being illegal) .29 Articles not
within these classes are merely evidentiary in nature ° and are pro-
teenth, imposed limitations upon state activity identical to those
imposed upon federal activity so that a desired uniformity between
federal and state law enforcement agencies can be maintained.
But the Court in Ker expressly stated that those rules which re-
flect the Supreme Court's supervisory authority over the lower federal
courts are not applicable to the states. [The Supreme Court is given
supervisory power over the lower federal courts by 62 Stat. 846 (1948),
18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964). Thus evidence may be inadmissible in federal
courts even though it does not violate the federal constitution. Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943).] Admissibility of evidence in the state courts is to be
determined solely by the constitutional proscriptions, for the Supreme
Court has no supervisory power over the state courts.
From Ker three conclusions affecting state legislative activity can
be drawn: (1) where the federal standards of reasonableness have
a constitutional basis they are applicable to the states, and the legis-
lature is precluded from sanctioning nonconformity by state officials;
(2) where the federal standards are not of a constitutional basis, but
arise out of the Court's supervisory power over lower federal courts,
these standards are inapplicable to the states, and the states are free
to establish their own standards within the confines of the reasonable-
ness requirement of the fourth amendment; (3) where no federal
standards have been expressed by the Court the legislature is free to
establish standards to promote local law enforcement, so long as these
standards meet the reasonableness test of the fourth amendment.
25 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
26 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
27 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886).
28 Ibid.
29 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1947).
80 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), held the evidentiary pro-
hibition applicable only to tangible objects. But Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), which held oral statements made during an
unreasonable search and seizure inadmissable, would seem to overrule
this by implication.
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tected from seizure by the fourth amendment.81
The sole basis for the constitutionality of the Nebraska statute
is found in the language in Ker which qualified the application of
the federal standards of search and seizure, applying to the states
only those standards which do not reflect the Supreme Court's
supervisory authority over the lower federal courts. Only if the
prohibition against a search for evidence has no constitutional
basis, but arises solely out of the Court's supervisory power, is the
statute constitutional.
The premise that the prohibition has no constitutional basis is
doubtful when its history is reviewed. The prohibition dates back
to the early English case of Entick v. Carrington,82 decided in 1765.
Entick was the author of a book which offended the government
and was regarded as seditious libel. In enforcing the book-licens-
ing act a general warrant was issued naming Entick, but failing
to name the article to be seized. Carrington, in executing the
warrant, broke into Entick's house, and conducted a search which
lasted four hours and culminated in the carrying away of several
hundred charts and pamphlets. Entick sued Carrington in tres-
pass for damages, and Carrington asserted the warrant as a de-
fense.
In affirming the trial court's verdict for Entick, Lord Camden
based his decision on two points. First, a search cannot be used
as an investigative tool; the evidence upon which to base a search
must be known before the warrant is issued. It was Lord Cam-
den's observation that the very fact the search was for evidence
was indicative of the insufficiency of the proof necessary to justify
the issuance of the warrant. The second basis of the decision in-
volved the concept of seizure of. evidence as a form of self-
incrimination. This was later cited with approval in Boyd v.
United States.3 3 In Boyd the federal government contended that
goods had been illegally imported in violation of the customs laws
and an action was brought calling for the forfeiture of the goods.
An act of Congress made failure to produce certain documents
concerning the goods a conclusive presumption of guilt. The Su-
preme Court sustained the defendant's contention that the statute
requiring production of the documents violated his fifth amend-
31 If it is objectional to seize the article the government is further pro-
hibited from using the objects to obtain other incriminating evidence
against the defendant. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920).
32 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
33 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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ment right against self-incrimination and, in addition, held it to be
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment. In the Court's opinion, Justice Bradley quoted En-
tick v. Carrington for the proposition that the two rights were
intertwined and then summarized:
[A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testi-
mony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation
of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments run almost into each other.8 4
This similarity between the search for evidence and self-in-
crimination was again recognized in Mapp when the Court quoted
Boyd's comparison of the fourth and fifth amendments with
approval.s 5
Although the prohibition against the search for evidence has
been severely criticized,8 6 when the common law basis of the pro-
hibition and its subsequent approval in Boyd and Mapp are con-
sidered along with its interrelationship with the fifth amendment,
which has been held applicable to the states, 7 it is doubtful the
rule arises out of the Court's supervisory power and has no con-
stitutional basis. A final determination must, of course, await a
Supreme Court decision, but the evidence overwhelmingly favors
the application of the prohibition to the states. It would thus
appear that the statute authorizing the evidentiary search, being
in violation of the prohibition, is unconstitutional.
B. PROCEDURAL STATUTES
Several of the new statutes are strictly procedural in nature.
Typical is Neb. Rev. Stat. section 29-822 which provides that any
motion to suppress seized evidence must be made at least ten days
before trial, or at the time of arraignment, whichever is later. Fail-
ure to make timely motion constitutes waiver of the right to move
for exclusion of the evidence.88 Where the defendant is surprised
by the evidence, however, the court may entertain a motion to sup-
84 Id. at 630.
35 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961).
36 See Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal
Law, 49 CALIF. L.R. 474, 477-79 (1961). But see Comment, Limitations
on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects-A Rule in Search of a Reason,
20 U. Cm. L. REV. 319 (1953), which suggests that the reason for the
rule lies in the need for additional protection of the right to privacy.
See also 20 MicH. L. REv. 93 (1921).
87 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
88 NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-822 (Supp. 1963).
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press. This is an adaptation of Federal Rule 41(e),3 the relevant
part providing: "The motion shall be made before trial or hearing
unless opportunity therefore did not exist or the defendant was
not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its
discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing."
In Segurola v. United States40 the Supreme Court upheld such
a procedure. The defendant had failed to object to the evidence(illegally seized liquor) at the time of its introduction. Only at
the conclusion of the government's case was a motion made to
suppress the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and on
appeal the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that:
[E]xcept where there has been no opportunity to present the
matter in advance of trial... a court, when engaged in trying a
criminal case, will not take notice of the manner in which wit-
nesses have possessed themselves of papers or other articles of
personal property, which are material and properly offered in evi-
dence, because the court will not in trying a criminal cause per-
mit a collateral issue to be raised as to the source of competent
evidence. 41
Obviously, the orderly administration of justice requires that mo-
tions to suppress be made before the trial wherever possible.42
With such a procedure expressly authorized by the Supreme
Court there can be little doubt that the Nebraska statute is con-
stitutional.
Neb. Rev. Stat. section 29-823 is less justifiable than the pre-
trial motion requirement. It provides that all questions of fact on
motion to suppress shall be tried without jury and: "No evidence
shall be suppressed because of technical. irregularities not af-
fecting the substantial rights of the accused." 43 The statute is di-
rected toward preventing what Justice Cardozo was referring to
when he said: "[T]he criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered." 44 But such an approach to the problem of non-
substantive error promotes police negligence and ignorance.
What policeman will bother to check a warrant for a correct name
39 62 Stat. 820 (1948); 18 U.S.C. § 3114 (1964).
40 275 U.S. 106 (1927).
41 Id. at 111-12.
42 A second reason often given by the courts for denying the objection
after the trial has commenced is that a prosecutor may be misled and
rely on that evidence to prove guilt, and, as a result, fail to acquire
other evidence which would be unnecessary if no objection was made.
See State v. Davis, 1 Ohio St. 2d 28, 203 N.E.2d 357 (1964).
43 NEs. Rsv. STAT. § 29-823 (Supp. 1963).
44 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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or address if the court will excuse his mistake? A premium will
be placed on police ignorance at the expense of the accused's pro-
cedural rights. Little justification can be found for such a statute.
A great deal of discretion has, as always, been given to the
states in the administration of their courts. The application of the
fourth amendment to the states represents no infringement on that
discretion. This was emphasized in Mapp:
As is always the case ... state procedural requirements governing
assertion and pursuance of direct and collateral constitutional
challenges to criminal prosecutions must be respected.45
The states are free to establish any procedures they desire subject,
as always, to the due process clause.
C. THE STOP AND FRIsK STATUTE
The 1965 session of the Nebraska legislature adopted the con-
troversial "stop and frisk" statute46 which significantly broadens
statutory police authority. It authorizes a policeman to stop, in a
public place, any person whom he reasonably suspects has com-
mitted, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, and provides
that he may demand the individual's name, address, and an ex-
planation of his actions. ft further provides that if the officer rea-
sonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may
search the person detained for dangerous weapons. If the officer
finds a weapon or any article possession of which is a crime, he
may take and retain it until the end of the questioning, at which
time he shall either return the article or arrest the person.47
Prior to the passage of this statute policemen were not au-
thorized to detain a person for questioning on the basis of "rea-
sonable suspicion", nor did police have authority to search an
individual for dangerous weapons until an arrest had been made.
The federal constitution requires that arrests and searches be
based upon probable cause. By requiring only reasonable sus-
picion upon which to detain and search a person, the statute sets
up a lesser standard for a detention than is required by the con-
stitution for an arrest.48
45 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 n.9 (1961).
46 Neb. Laws 1965, ch. 132, at 471. The name "stop and frisk" is a
misnomer because the statute expressly authorizes a search incident
to the detention and not a frisk.
47 The detention is a frequently used police tactic. See Note, Philadelphia
Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952).
48 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933). Held: "Mere
affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough [to sustain a search]."
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The "stop and frisk" statute originated in New York,49 where it
was passed amidst considerable controversy and opposition. °
While New York limited the right to detain to felonies and certain
misdemeanors, the Nebraska legislature has revised the statute
and extended it to "any crime."51 The statute is a derivation of
the Uniform Arrest Act 52 which provides for the stopping and
questioning of an individual up to two hours when there is "rea-
sonable grounds to suspect" a crime. A search for dangerous
weapons is also authorized to protect the officer. The Uniform
Arrest Act grants considerably greater authority to the police
than the "stop and frisk" statute. Nevertheless, it has been
adopted by two states in toto,53 and with the period of detention
extended, by a third.54 Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Missouri have
also adopted statutes authorizing detentions,55 and detentions have
been judicially authorized in other states.5"
A case which well illustrates the statute's inherent constitu-
tional problems is Rivera v. People,57 which was recently decided
by the New York Court of Appeals. At 1:30 in the morning
49 N.Y. CODE CRiv. PRoc. § 180(a). See generally 30 BROOKLYN L. REV.
274 (1964); 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 392, 398 (1964); 78 HARV. L. REV. 473
(1964).
50 "Committees of the New York City and State Bar Associations dis-
approved of the bill as enacted and questioned its constitutionality."
78 HA~v. L. REV. 473, 474 n.11 (1964).
51 This, presumably, would not include minor traffic infractions, which
are considered civil in nature.
52 See generally Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REy. 315, 318-
19 (1942).
58 DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902-03 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§
12-7-1 to -2 (1956).
54 N.H. REV. STAT. AN. §§ 594:2, 594:3 (1960).
55 MIAss. GEN. LAws Au-. ch. 41, § 98 (1961); HAwAI Rv. LAws §§ 255-
4, 5 (1955) (reasonable suspicion-forty-eight hours); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 544.170 (1959) (suspicion-twenty hours).
56 People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956); People v. Rivera,
14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964); People v. Henne-
man, 367 fI. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937) (dictum); State v. Chronister,
353 P.2d 493 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); City of Portland v. Goodwin,
187 Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577 (1949); State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424,
164 S.E. 518 (1932). Some federal courts have also upheld detentions.
United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir. 1961); United States
v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds,
285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
57 People v. Rivera, supra note 56. The court emphasized at the outset
that the New York "stop and frisk" statute was not applicable to the
case and no decision was reached concerning it because its passage was
subsequent to Rivera's trial.
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three plainclothes detectives, while cruising about lower Manhat-
tan, observed two men walking by a bar and grill. The men
stopped, looked in the window, continued to walk a few steps,
came back, and looked in the window again. Upon observing the
unmarked police car they began walking rapidly away. One of the
detectives then got out of the car and ordered the two men to stop.
The detective then approached Rivera and proceeded to "frisk"
him by "patting" his clothing, whereupon a .22 caliber gun was
discovered. In a subsequent trial for criminally carrying a loaded
pistol a motion to suppress the seized evidence was granted be-
cause the officer at the time of the search lacked probable cause.
On appeal from the motion to suppress, the Appellate Division af-
firmed but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Briefly, the Court of Appeals held that the stopping of Rivera
was only for the purpose of inquiry and did not constitute an
arrest. Being an inquiry and not an arrest, it was not subject
to the requirements of the fourth amendment and was authorized
by a belief less than probable cause. The court emphasized that
the right to detain is a necessary police investigative tool58 which
was recognized at early common law. The "frisk" incident to the
detention was then carefully distinguished by the court from a
search on the basis of the extent of the invasion of privacy which
had occurred. Because the frisk was a lesser invasion the court
felt that "[i]t ought to be distinguishable . . . on pragmatic
grounds from the degree of constitutional protection that would
surround a full-blown search of the person."59 The sense of exterior
58 Barret, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment,
1960 SUPREME COURT REViEW, 46, 59, 63-65. Other authors have at-
tempted to justify the detention on the ground that, contrasted to an
arrest, it is less conspicuous, less humiliating to the person stopped,
and offers less chance for police coercion. See LaFave, Detention for
Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962
WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 356-60. That detentions would tend to prevent police
coercion is questionable because a magistrate's review of cause for the
detention would never occur and police would be free to abuse the
privilege. In contrast, a search based upon probable cause requires a
magistrate's review even when incident to an arrest. As Mr. Justice
Douglas stated in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), a case
involving an "administrative arrest" on less than probable cause:
"Some things in our protective scheme of civil rights are entrusted to
the udiciary. Those controls are not always congenial to the police.
Yet if we are to preserve our system of checks and balances and keep
the police from being all-powerful, these judicial controls should be
meticulously respected." Id. at 247. See also Jaffe, Judicial Review:
Question of Law, 69 HARv. L. REV. 239, 274 (1955).
59 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 446, 201 N.E.2d 32, 37, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458,
463 (1964).
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touch, the court explained, is quite similar to the sense of sight or
hearing which the police customarily use. Something less than
probable cause was sufficient to authorize a "frisk", although the
exact degree of belief necessary was not stated. The court con-
cluded by citing Ker 6o for the proposition that the states are free to
establish workable rules to meet local problems.
The court, in Rivera, distinguished the detention from an ar-
rest on the basis of the degree of invasion of the individual's free-
dom of movement which had occurred. Similarly, they distin-
guished a frisk from a search on the basis of the invasion of the
individual's right to privacy which had occurred. Because the in-
vasion of the individual's rights had been slight in both cases the
court felt that probable cause was not necessary; the less the inva-
sion the less the probability necessary to justify it.6
This is not a new approach to the fourth amendment. Since
the adoption of the reasonableness test in Rabinowitz,6 2 several
authors have suggested that a calculus of reasons should be de-
veloped, out of which a determination of reasonableness could be
made. In determining the reasonableness of any invasion of rights
protected by the fourth amendment, consideration would have to
be given to the community need prompting the search, the prob-
ability of success, the seriousness of the invasion of privacy in-
volved, possible sanctions which might be imposed subsequent to
the search, and the possible injury to reputation which might oc-
cur. Under such an approach the probability of success (i.e.
probable cause) would be only one factor in determining the rea-
sonableness of the search. If the other factors were of sufficient
60 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
61 As Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949), when dealing with probable cause we are speaking
in terms of probability. This probability refers to the likelihood of a
search being successful. In all cases probable cause (i.e. a certain
probability that the search will be successful) must exist before the
search is initiated for it to be reasonable. No matter how great the
societal need which prompted the search, probable cause must be pres-
ent; even a threshold entry requires probable cause. Unlike the other
requirements of a reasonable search, the probable cause requirement
is not balanced against the needs of society. Thus probable cause (i.e.
probability that the search will be successful) is the same to validate
a search for a bomb in a large office building as the probable cause
which will validate a search for the fruits of a minor crime such as
petty larceny. Even though the societal need for the search for a
bomb is substantially greater, the probability .that must be shown is
the same.
62 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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weight, a belief less than probable cause would justify the search
(as in Rivera).63
Proponents of this approach to the determination of reason-
ableness point to Frank v. Maryland 4 in support of their position.
In Frank, a city health inspector made a search of the appellant's
premises for "rats and rubbish". The inspector lacked probable
cause on which to base the search. The Supreme Court upheld
the search, even in the absence of probable cause, distinguishing
an administrative search, as in Frank, from a search which might
be the prelude to the imposition of subsequent criminal sanctions.
The danger to the security of the individual, the Court felt, is
greater when the search is a preliminary step in a process which
might ultimately lead to trial and conviction. "The test of 'prob-
able cause' . . . [must take] into account the nature of the search
that is being sought. '65 Seemingly this indicates a recognition by
the Court that its previously used balancing test is inadequate and
that public policy might require a belief less than probable cause
in certain cases.
But does Frank indicate a willingness on the part of the
Court to allow a lesser degree of probability where the possibility
of a resulting criminal sanction exists? No Supreme Court deci-
sions support the contention that it does, and in light of the Court's
increasing solicitude toward criminal defendants it is doubtful
there will be such a decision."" Although the Supreme Court has
68 Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the
Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Ca. L. REV. 664 (1961); Leagre, The Fourth
Amendment and The Law of Arrest, 54 J. Cn vi.L., C.&P.S. 393 (1963).
64 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
65 Even the dissent recognized a distinction between the "administrative
search" and the search for "fruits" of a crime but felt there should be
a magistrate's review of cause in both cases. Id. at 383.
66 The only support for this proposition is Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent-
ing opinion in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), where
he implied that a calculus of reasons might be the appropriate method
of analyzing search and seizure problems. "[I]f we are to make judi-
cial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment . . . it seems to me they
should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense. If we as-
sume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a
roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The offi-
cers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any partic-
ular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an
action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reason-
able to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to
save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not
strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a
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not been faced directly with the problem of detention, in Henry v.
United States67 a majority of the Court agreed that the mere stop-
ping of the defendant's car was an arrest. This reaffirmation of
the requirement that even a "threshold entry" must be based upon
probable cause suggests a rejection of the "calculus test" used in
Rivera.
Even though the Supreme Court does not distinguish between
the evidence necessary for a slight or substantial invasion of pri-
vacy, the detention authorized under the "stop and frisk" statute
may still be constitutional if the Nebraska courts, in interpreting
the statute, equate reasonable suspicion with probable cause.68
If this occurs, the search incident to the detention may also be
constitutional, if incident to an arrest.69 If, however, reasonable
suspicion is interpreted to be a standard less than probable cause
the detention and the search incident to it would be unconstitu-
tional under the existing standards of reasonableness."°
This is not to say that all detentions are unconstitutional.
An officer may constitutionally detain and question an individual
so long as he is not detained against his will. Officers are not
prohibited by the constitution from making good faith inquiries
and observations to prevent crimes they reasonably believe are
about to occur. Once the individual has refused to cooperate,
however, he cannot be detained against his will unless probable
few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger." Id. at 183. See Kaplan,
Search and Seizure: A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF.
L. REV. 474 (1961).
67 361 U.S. 98 (1959). Two states have interpreted Henry to be based on
the Supreme Court's supervisory powers and having no constitutional
basis. People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr.
18 (1963); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1964).
68 If the detention is upheld problems of self-incrimination arise. See
Remington, Police Detention and Arrest Privileges, 51 3. CRnw.L.,
C.&P.S. 386, 391 (1960). Certainly an individual who is stopped does
not have to talk to a policeman. Nor can failure or refusal to talk
bear upon probable cause. See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States:
A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEs. L. REv. 483, 493-95 n.40 (1963).
e9 This statement is qualified because the right to search does not always
follow from the arrest. For example, an arrest for a minor traffic
violation will not sustain a search. See Comment, 6 WAYhm L. REv.
413 (1960).
70 Because the statute, in authorizing a detention, fails to (1) adequately
state the period for which the detention is allowed, (2) state the evi-
dence necessary to establish reasonable suspicion, and (3) limit the use
of the detentions to specified situations, the statute may fall under
the void-for-vagueness doctrine. See generally Note, The Void-For-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
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cause for an arrest exists.71  If the "stop and frisk" statute is
interpreted to authorize a detention only so long as an involuntary
restraint is not made, the detention clause of the statute is clearly
constitutional.72  This interpretation, however, would simply make
the statute declaratory of pre-existing law.
D. THE "KNOCK NOT" PROVISION
The 1965 session of the legislature adopted the companion bill
to the "stop and frisk" act, the "knock not" statute 7 3 which also
originated in New York.74 This statute provides that an officer
may break into a building to execute a warrant without notice of
his authority if the magistrate issuing the warrant finds either
that the property may be easily destroyed or, that the life or limb
of the officer may be endangered if such notice is given.
Prior to the passage of this statute, a police officer in Ne-
braska, in executing either an arrest or search warrant, was
required to give notice of his office and purpose before entering.
Only after he was refused admittance was he allowed to break into
the building to execute the warrant.75 The "knock not" statute,
however, allows the officer to enter, in certain circumstances, with-
out giving notice. The Nebraska statute, requiring that notice be
given before entry, is identical to the federal statute" which has
been adopted in most of the states, and is simply a codification of a
common law principle.7 7  Similarly, the "knock not" statute is a
codification of the doctrine of "exigent circumstances" which allows
a deviation from the fourth amendment requrement of notice
where necessity requires.
71 Broeder, supra note 68.
72 The search clause would still be unconstitutional, however, because all
searches require probable cause.
73 Neb. Laws 1965, ch. 149 at 491. See generally Blakey, The Rule of
Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States & Ker
v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1964).
74 N.Y. CODE Canvi. Paoc. § 799.
75 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-411 (Reissue 1964).
76 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964) provides, in part: "The officer may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of
a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance. .. ."
77 The doctrine dates back to the early English case of Semayne's Case,
5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1603), where the rule was stated
that: "In all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors
be not open) may break the party's house .... But before he
breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make
request to open doors. . . " Id. at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195.
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Although the constitutionality of the statute has not been
ruled on, in Ker v. Cahiforni1 8 state police officers, without a war-
rant, executed a search incident to an arrest without giving notice
before entry. California had adopted the federal statute requiring
that all searches be preceded by notice79 But the California court
had judicially made an exception to the statute. Where the articles
to be seized could be easily destroyed notice was unnecessary.80
The defendant in Ker was known to be in possession of narcotics
which were easily disposed of and an entry without notice was
therefore "lawful" under the California statute. In affirming the
seizure of the narcotics when the entry had been made without
notice, the Supreme Court held that "in the particular circum-
stances of this case the officers' method of entry, sanctioned by the
law of California, was not unreasonable under the standards of the
Fourth Amendment as applied to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment."81
The Ker decision answers the question of the constitutionality
of the "knock not" statute, for if it is constitutionally reasonable
for an officer on the scene to determine that cause exists for
waiving the announcement requirement, a fortiori it is reasonable
under the fourth amendment for a magistrate to determine, at
the time the warrant is issued, that justification exists for waiver
of the announcement requirement.
While the Ker decision turned on the destructibility of the
articles sought to be seized, the doctrine of "exigent circumstances"
would certainly allow an officer who reasonably believed that
announcement of entry would endanger his life to waive the no-
tice requirement.82 There is little doubt the statute is constitu-
tional so long as the announcement requirement is discriminately
waived.
78 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
79 CAL. PEN. CODE § 844.
80 People v. Ruiz, 146 Cal. App. 2d 630, 304 P.2d 175 (1956); People v.
Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858
(1956).
81 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963).
82 There appears to be only one reported case in which danger to the
officer making the search was recognized. Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166
(1822). Nevertheless, the justification for waiver of the announce-
ment requirement would be substantially greater where there was
danger to the officer than where the justification was only acquisition
of evidence.
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III. CONCLUSION
Certainly any legislative attempt to clarify and establish rea-
sonable standards of search and seizure should be commended.
Unfortunately, however, some of Nebraska's recent legislation has
not been directed toward the solution of these problems. Instead,
the legislature appears to have attempted to pacify highly vocal
law enforcement groups who insist that recent Supreme Court
decisions, and Mapp in particular, have severely restricted law
enforcement agencies8 3 (with a resulting increase in the crime
rate) .84
Police and prosecutors strenuously resist what they like to call
"tighter restrictions" on their powers. But more often than not,
what they are really bristling about is tighter enforcement of long
standing restrictions. Thus, many in law enforcement reacted to
the adoption of the exclusionary rule as if the guarantees against
unreasonable search and seizure had just been written.8 5
Nevertheless their pleas for greater discretion in investigative
procedures have fallen on receptive ears. Thus, the legislature,
interested in an "apparently simple solution" to the crime problem
has yielded to their demands and passed the desired legislation.
Typical are the "stop and frisk" and "evidentiary search" statutes,
which, if upheld, would substantially impair the constitutional
rights of the citizens of the state of Nebraska.
In contrast, the procedural statutes and the "knock not" pro-
vision provide workable standards for the courts and law enforce-
ment agencies without unreasonably encroaching upon the in-
dividual's rights. Such legislation is commendable. Future legis-
lative attempts can be equally satisfactory if the legislature will
keep in mind the statement made by Mr. Justice Clark in Ker
when referring to the application of the fourth amendment stand-
ards to the states:
88 Typical is the statement made by Senator Eugene Mahoney of Omaha,
a former Omaha police vice squad officer and sponsor of the "stop
and frisk" and the "knock not" statutes. "The U.S. Supreme Court
has hindered police efforts with recent decisions. We need some laws
that will help the police, not the criminals." The Lincoln Star, Feb.
19, 1965, p. 6, col. 1.
84 Considerable gloss has been removed from the argument that recent
decisions unduly hinder law enforcement agencies by the FBI's excel-
lent record under the federal standards. See generally Hoover, Civil
Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the FBI, 37 IowA L. REV.
175 (1951); see also Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution
Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 Com uzL L.Q. 436 (1964).
85 Id. at 440.
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The states are not thereby precluded from developing workable
rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet "the prac-
tical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforce-
ment" in the States, provided that those rules do not violate the
constitutional proscriptions of unreasonable searches and seizures
and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is inadmis-
sable against one who has standing to complain.8 6
E. John Stanley '66
sO Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
